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Abstract
International law, particularly treaties on human rights, has great 
infl uence on the development of the right to freedom of expression. 
The application of international treaties is very much dependant on 
the constitutions of individual countries and these constitutions to 
a large extent are dissimilar from one to another. The position in 
the United Kingdom is relatively unique since the country has no 
codifi ed written constitution to safeguard the fundamental right to 
freedom of expression and as a result it was regarded as residual 
in nature. Nonetheless, the provisions of the international treaties, 
particularly the European Convention on the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) have altered this 
position and accordingly freedom of expression has been formally 
incorporated into the UK law via the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). 
Meanwhile, the international human rights treaties is considered 
to have less infl uence in Malaysia arguably since the country has 
a written constitution (the Federal Constitution) that contains a 
specifi c part on fundamental liberties including the right to freedom 
of expression. 
Keywords: International law, treaties, freedom of expression. 
Introduction
The term ‘international law’ was mentioned for the fi rst time in 1789 
by Jeremy Bentham, an English scholar and philosopher,2 to refer to 
‘the mutual transaction between sovereigns as such’.3 Since then, 
*  Faculty of Law & International Relations, Universiti Sultan Zainal Abidin 
(UNISZA)
1 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. 
Printed in the Year 1780, and Now First Published. By Jeremy Bentham 
(London: printed for T. Payne, and Son, 1789), 6.
3 Ibid, 296.
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international law, which is also commonly referred to as ‘public 
international law’, has traditionally been considered as law that 
governs rights and obligations between independent states.4 This 
conservative perception is no longer accurate since the subjects5 
of international law have been extended to include international 
organisations and to some extent individuals,6 even though any 
individuals could only enforce their rights under international law 
through action by states.7 For that reason, states remain the principal 
members of the international community8 and the discussion on the 
operation of international law is invariably related to states. 
In general, the operation of international law is very much 
dependent on the constitutional framework of the states. Though 
no two constitutions are identical, two general theories namely 
dualism9 and monism10 have been developed to distinguish 
approaches adopted by states.11 The former regards international 
law and domestic law as two different systems of law12 and thus 
rights and obligations created by international law do not form part 
of the domestic law unless they are ‘transformed’ into domestic 
law by specifi c legislation. Whilst the latter considers international 
law is ipso facto part of domestic law13 that can directly be applied 
by the domestic courts. As to the sources of international law, it is 
4 Detailed discussions on the interpretation of the term ‘international law, 
see Mark W Janis, “Individuals as Subjects of International Law,” Cornell 
International Law Journal 17 (1984): 62 -64.
5 The word ‘subjects’ in this context refers to persons or entities to which 
international law applies.
6 Lassa Francis Lawrence Oppenheim, Oppenheim’s International Law: Volume 
1 Peace, ed. Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts, vol. 1, 9th ed. (New York: 
Oxford University Press, USA, 2008), 16. 
7 Anthony Aust, Handbook of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 13 - 14.
8 Javaid Rehman, International Human Rights Law: A Practical Approach 
(Harlow: Longman, 2003), 14.
9 Dualism is based on the theory that mind and matter are separate.
10 Monism originates from the theory which denies any duality of mind and 
matter. Thus, international law and domestic law are not separate. 
11 Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 181 - 188.
12 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 7th ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 31 - 33.
13  Abdul Ghafur Hamid, “Judicial Application of International Law in Malaysia: 
A Critical Analysis,” Asia-Pacifi c Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 
Vol. 1 (2005): 196 - 198.
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stipulated in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice that international customs, international treaties and general 
principles of law constitute its primary sources.14 Nonetheless, 
since the primary intention of this study is to provide a comparative 
analysis on the application of international treaties that is specifi cally 
related to freedom of expression in the United Kingdom (the UK) 
and Malaysia, other sources of international law will therefore be 
intentionally left out and not covered in this paper.
Overview of International Treaties
A ‘treaty’ is defi ned in Article 2(a) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (the VCLT)15 as:
An international agreement concluded between States 
in written form and governed by international law, 
whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or 
more related instruments and whatever its particular 
designation. 
A treaty is also interpreted as ‘a written agreement by which two or 
more States create or intend to create a relation between themselves 
operating within the sphere of international law’.16 Thus, the gist of a 
treaty is an agreement entered into by two states or more, irrespective 
of the nomenclature or term used to connote the agreement such as 
convention, charter, covenant, protocol and many others.
Since a treaty is established upon mutually agreed legal relations 
between the contracting parties, its provisions and terms shall be 
enforceable and binding only on those related parties. Non-States 
parties or third States are not obliged to comply with rights and 
14 Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice states that 
‘The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law 
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: (a) International conventions, 
whether general or particular, establishing rules recognised by the contesting 
States; (b) International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as 
law; (c) The general principles of law recognised by civilised nations; …’.
15 The VCLT was adopted in Vienna on 22 May 1969 and opened for signature on 
23 May 1969 by the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties. It has 
entered into force on 27 January 1980 and as at 28 June 2011, the VCLT has 
been ratifi ed by 111 States.
16 Arnold Duncan McNair, The Law of Treaties (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 
15.
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obligations of any treaty based on the traditional terminology of 
pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt. This general rule is now been 
incorporated in Article 34 of the VCLT which provides that ‘a treaty 
does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without 
its consent’. However, in certain circumstances it is possible for a 
treaty to create third-party rights provided that those parties bestow 
their consent to such treaty. This is clearly stated in Article 36(1) of 
the VCLT which provides that:
A right arises for a third State from a provision of a 
treaty if the parties to the treaty intend the provision to 
accord that right either to the third State, or to a group 
of States to which it belongs, or to all States, and the 
third States assents thereto…. 
Therefore, in the absence of any express consent by the third State, 
the general rule of non-applicability of the terms of a treaty to non-
related parties applies. 
Application of International Treaties in the United Kingdom
The uncodifi ed constitution of the UK which confers no special status 
to international treaties has explicitly demonstrated the status of the 
country as a dualist state. Any treaties concluded by the Crown shall 
bind the state in international law but they could not be enforced 
in the domestic courts.17 This has been confi rmed by the House of 
Lords in the case of J.H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v Department 
of Trade and Industry and Others18 whereby it was observed that:
...the Crown’s power to conclude treaties with 
other sovereign states was an exercise of the Royal 
Prerogative, the validity of which could not be 
challenged in municipal courts; but that the Royal 
Prerogative did not extend to altering domestic law 
or rights of individuals without the intervention of 
Parliament and a treaty was not part of English law 
unless and until it had been incorporated into it by 
legislation….19 
17 Supra note 10, 189 - 192.
18 [1990] 2 A.C. 418.
19 Ibid, 420.
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The judgment clearly highlights the Crown’s prerogative power 
in making treaties and any unenacted treaties have no legal effects 
domestically until they are incorporated20 into the domestic law. 
This refl ects the fundamental constitutional principles namely the 
sovereignty of Parliament21 and the separation of powers between 
the Crown, the Parliament and the courts22 which had long been 
rooted and applied in the country since the eighteenth-century.23 
These doctrines confer the Parliament with the supreme power to 
enact laws whilst the treaty-making power is exclusively vested 
with the Crown (in practice the Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs).24 No prior consent of the Parliament is 
necessary, except for the Ponsonby Rules which require a treaty to 
be laid before the Parliament with a short explanatory memorandum 
for 21 days while Parliament is sitting. The signifi cance of this rule 
is that it ensures the Parliament is informed about the treaty but it 
does not render the treaty to be part of the domestic law.
The UK has at present ratifi ed fi ve out of nine core international 
treaties on human rights namely; the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (CAT).25 Out of these treaties, the ICCPR26 is regarded 
as the most signifi cant treaty pertaining to the right to freedom of 
expression as it among others guarantees the fundamental rights of 
opinion and expression. Article 19(2) of the ICCPR provides that: 
20 Incorporation into domestic law can take three forms. For details see supra note 
6, 82.
21 Philip Sales and Joanne Clement, “International Law in Domestic Courts: The 
Developing Framework,” Law Quarterly Review, no. 124 (2008): 389.
22 Supra note 10, 188.
23 Peter Leyland, The Constitution of the United Kingdom: A Contextual Analysis 
(Oxford: Hart, 2007), 53.
24 Supra note 6, 81.
25 Further details on the list of international treaties ratifi ed by the United Kingdom 
see http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/Statusfrset?OpenFrameSet, (accessed 16 
March 2010).
26 ICCPR was approved by the Third Committee of the General Assembly in 
December 1966 and later came into force in 1976. Further details see supra 
note 7, 62 - 103.
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Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; 
this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless 
of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the 
form of art, or through any other media of his choice. 
Nonetheless, the provisions of the ICCPR had not been incorporated 
into the domestic law of the country plainly because identical 
provisions could be found in the European Convention on the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). 
In addition, the ECHR had also been ratifi ed earlier in 195127 and 
came into force two years later28 compared to the ICCPR which was 
only ratifi ed on 16 September 1968.
Relation between International Treaties and Freedom of Expression 
in the United Kingdom
Freedom of expression is one of the fundamental liberties and an 
essential characteristic of democratic countries. Its signifi cance 
has been reiterated in the landmark case of Handyside v. United 
Kingdom29 that the freedom ‘constitutes one of the essential 
foundations of such a society, one of the basic conditions for its 
progress and for the development of every man’.30 The importance 
of this right has been acknowledged and guaranteed at international 
level by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); 
international human rights treaties, particularly the ICCPR, as 
well as by regional human rights regimes namely the ECHR, the 
American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José) and the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter).31 
At national level, the right to freedom of expression is safeguarded 
by various provisions contained in written constitutions and bills 
of human rights. This right has also received judicial recognition in 
numerous cases across various jurisdictions.
27 Helen Fenwick and Gavin Phillipson, Media Freedom under the Human Rights 
Act (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 1.
28 Geoffrey Robertson and Andrew Nicol, Media Law, 5th ed. (London: Penguin, 
2008), 42.
29 (1979 – 80) 1 E.H.R.R. 737.
30 Ibid, 754.
31 For detailed discussion on human rights regimes, see Burns H Weston, 
Robin Ann Lukes and Kelly M Hnatt, ‘Regional Human Rights Regimes: A 
Comparison and Appraisal’, Vanderbilt Journal of Transanational Law, 20 
(1987), 585: pp. 592 - 614.
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Several justifi cations have been submitted for the safeguarding and 
protecting freedom of expression including the discovery of truth, 
self-fulfi lment, citizen participation in democracy and suspicion 
of government.32 In Regina v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department,33 Lord Steyn observed that freedom of expression could 
be justifi ed on three grounds namely promoting the self-fulfi lment of 
individuals, discovering the truth through the competition of ideas 
and serving as lifeblood of democracy.34 In relation to democracy, 
Lord Keith in Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspaper Ltd35 
ruled that ‘it is of the highest importance that a democratically 
elected government body should be open to uninhibited public 
criticism’.36 Further, in Lingens v. Austria37 it was observed that 
‘freedom of political debate’ lies ‘at the very core of the concept of 
a democratic society which prevails throughout the Convention’.38 
Hence, the exercise of this right ought to be realised and safeguarded 
by countries that adopt democratic systems. 
The exercise of the right to freedom of expression in the UK is greatly 
affected by the provisions of the ECHR. The ECHR was originally 
developed by the Council of Europe to protect against the revival 
of repressive dictatorships by ensuring ‘the collective enforcement 
of the rights stated in the UDHR’.39 It is argued that the regional 
human rights regime such as the ECHR holds a greater promise of 
effectiveness than the universal regime and is expressly encouraged 
by the United Nations Charter itself.40 Perhaps due to this reason, 
the UK was the fi rst state to ratify the provisions of the ECHR. 
Unfortunately, the treaty remained unenforceable in the domestic 
32 Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005), 6 - 23; Kent Greenawalt, “Free Speech Justifi cations,” Columbia Law 
Review 89 (1989): 131; Supra note 26, 12 - 19.
33 [2000] 2 A.C. 115
34 Ibid, 126.
35 [1993] A.C. 534.
36 Ibid, 547.
37 (1986) 8 E.H.R.R. 407
38 Ibid, 419.
39 Arthur Henry Robertson and John Graham Merrills, Human Rights in the 
World: An Introduction to the Study of the International Protection of Human 
Rights, 4th ed. (Manchester, Eng: Manchester University Press, 1996), 120 - 124.
40 Supra, note 30, 588 - 589.
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courts though it was concluded and ratifi ed by the Crown in 1951.41 
The provisions of the ECHR shall bind the state in international law 
but they could not be enforced directly in the domestic courts as they 
had yet to be incorporated into the domestic laws.42
Since the ECHR remains unenforceable in the domestic courts, 
cases of alleged violations of human rights are brought against the 
government in the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 
Strasbourg. Individuals in the country were only permitted to fi le 
petition to the ECtHR in 1966 43 and the fi rst successful individual 
complaint was in the 1975 case of Golder v. United Kingdom44 
whereby it was ruled that the government was guilty of violating 
Article 6 and 8 of the ECHR. The fi rst case involving a violation of 
Article 10 was the case of The Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom45 
in which the UK was found guilty of violating Article 10 when the 
interference with the applicant newspaper’s freedom to publish the 
thalidomide tragedy was not justifi ed by a ‘pressing social need’ 
and therefore could not be considered ‘necessary’ within clause 2 of 
Article 10.46 Afterwards, there were many cases fi led against the UK 
government and the loss of these cases at Strasbourg is claimed to 
have led to the incorporation of the ECHR into domestic law via the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA).47
The HRA, which was enacted to give ‘further effects to rights and 
freedoms’48 of the ECHR, has greatly changed the landscape of 
human rights law in the UK. The HRA has incorporated a number 
of the ECHR articles into its schedule and these provisions are now 
referred to as the Convention rights. Nonetheless, a few articles 
namely Articles 1, 13 and 15 are not included within the scope of the 
41 Helen Fenwick, Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), p. 1.
42 Supra note 10, 189 - 192.
43 Supra note 27, 42.
44 (1979 - 80) 1 E.H.R.R. 524 
45 (1979 - 80) 2 E.H.R.R. 245 
46 Ibid, 278 – 280.
47 Anthony Aust, “United Kingdom,” in The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty 
Enforcement: A Comparative Study, ed. David Sloss (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 486.
48 Long title to the HRA.
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Convention rights. 49 Article 1 is left out simply because the obligation 
to respect human rights only applies between the contracting states 
and could not be determined by the local courts.50 Similarly, Article 
15 which relates with derogation in time of emergency is also an 
international obligation under the ECHR and could not be reviewed 
by the domestic courts.51 However, Article 13 which provides for the 
right to an effective remedy is arguably omitted to avoid confusion 
with sections 7, 8 and 9 of the HRA that are specifi cally formulated 
to lay down the remedial structure in the UK.52 
Prior to the coming into force of the HRA, any issues relating 
to freedom of expression were addressed by the judges with 
reference to the common law principles since the country does 
not have any codifi ed written constitution. In the case of AG v. 
Guardian Newspaper Ltd (No. 2),53 Lord Goff stated that ‘freedom 
of expression has existed in this country perhaps as long, if not 
longer, than it has existed in the world’,54  indicating that freedom of 
expression has long been recognised in the country’s legal system. 
However, it was argued that the absence of express provisions on 
freedom of expression rendered such right residual in nature since 
its exercise was subject to any restrictions imposed by the law.55 
This position has been reaffi rmed by Lord Donaldson in the same 
case that ‘the starting point of our domestic law is that citizen has 
a right to do what he likes, unless restrained by the common law 
or statute’.56 Nevertheless, the ECHR principles have already left a 
signifi cant impact on the UK domestic law and have been applied; 
either indirectly through judgments against the UK government 
by the ECtHR in Strasbourg, or directly through the use of legal 
49 Section 1(1) provides that the phrase ‘Convention rights’ to cover ‘Articles 2 to 
12 and 14 of the Convention, Articles 1 to 3 of the First Protocol, and Articles 1 
and 2 of the Sixth Protocol, as read with Articles 16 to 18 of the Convention’.
50 Alastair N Brown, Human Rights Act 1998, Greens annotated acts (Edinburgh: 
W.Green, 2003), 4 - 5.
51 Ibid.
52 Human Rights Act 1998, 2nd ed., Current Law Statutes Annotated Reprints 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1998), 42-8.
53 [1990] 1 AC 109. 
54 Ibid. 283.
55 Supra note 31, 40.
56 Supra note 52, 178.
26
arguments based on the ECHR in the domestic courts.57 However, 
these provisions could only be considered by the courts as the last 
resort especially in cases where there was ambiguity in the statute 
affecting the Convention rights or when the courts were uncertain on 
the application of any point of the common law.58 
The situation is reversed post the HRA era as courts in the UK 
are required to consider relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence when 
determining any issues related with the Convention rights.59 Further, 
the HRA creates an important obligation on the courts to interpret 
all primary and subsidiary legislation (past or future) wherever 
possible to be in compliance with the Convention rights.60 The 
HRA also mandates all public authorities including the courts to act 
compatibly with the Convention rights unless they are forbidden 
from doing so by primary or secondary legislation.61 Further, it also 
enables a person who claims to be a ‘victim’ of the public authority 
to commence legal proceedings in any relevant domestic court 
or tribunal to enforce his rights.62 Any person who is not a victim 
and cannot initiate legal actions under section 7 may still rely on 
the court’s obligation to interpret legislation compatibly with the 
Convention rights. Thus, the incorporation of the provisions of the 
ECHR into the domestic laws has established a positive milieu for 
the operation of the freedom of expression in the UK.
The Right to Freedom of Expression in the United Kingdom
Article 10 of the ECHR, which is incorporated as appendixes 
in the HRA, adopted almost word by word of Article 1963 of the 
UDHR.64 The article confers the right to freedom of expression on 
57 Blackstone’s Guide to the Human Rights Act 1998, 4th ed. (London: Blackstone, 
2007), 4 - 5.
58 Supra note 51, 42 - 43.
59 Section 2 of the HRA.
60 Section 3(1) of the HRA.
61 Section 6 of the HRA.
62 Section 7 of the HRA.
63 Article 19 provides that ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference 
and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas though any media and 
regardless of frontiers’.
64 The UDHR is a non-binding declaration and was adopted by the United Nations 
in 1948 as part of the International Bill of Human Rights. 
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all individuals in the Member States including the UK. Paragraph 1 
of the said article provides:
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. 
This right includes the freedom to hold opinions and 
to receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by a public authority and regardless of 
frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from 
requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or 
cinema enterprise.
Thus, paragraph 1 clearly provides the scope of such right to 
include freedom to hold opinions, freedom to impart information 
and ideas and freedom to receive information and ideas. These 
freedoms shall be enjoyed free from any interference by public 
authorities and irrespective of the medium by which the expression 
is communicated. However, the exercise of freedom of expression is 
subject to certain restrictions as per stated in paragraph 2 of the same 
article. Paragraph 2 states that:
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with 
it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such 
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society, in the interest of national security, territorial 
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for 
the protection of the reputation or rights of others, 
for preventing the disclosure of information received 
in confi dence or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary.
Thus, the right to freedom of expression is not absolute and can 
be restricted on seven grounds set out in paragraph 2. There are 
numerous cases that highlight the restrictions imposed by the UK 
government. The fi rst major case that occurred after the enactment of 
the HRA is the case of R v Shayler.65 In this case, the House of Lords 
had to determine whether the ban imposed by the Offi cial Secrets 
Act 1998 was disproportionate to protect the national security and 
65 [2003] 1 A.C. 247.
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therefore incompatible with the HRA that grants the right to freedom 
of expression. By referring to the relevant ECtHR rulings, it was 
held that the restrictions to the free speech were not disproportionate 
as the ban was not absolute but was merely confi ned to disclosure 
without lawful authority.
It is important to emphasise that the restrictions may only be 
imposed subject to limitations ‘prescribed by law’ and ‘necessary 
in a democratic society’ under paragraph 2 of Article 10. Apart from 
that, section 12 of the HRA accords more protection to this right by 
preventing injunctions being granted ex parte by the courts unless all 
practicable steps to notify the person against whom such injunctions 
to be made or there are compelling reasons why he should not be 
notifi ed. Further, the courts are required to look at the merits of 
the case before granting any relief. Thus, this requirement makes 
interim restraints more diffi cult in cases where the right to freedom 
of expression is at issue. For example according to section 12 (4) of 
the HRA the court is required to have ‘particular regard’ to the right 
to freedom of expression where the proceedings relate to material 
which the respondent claims, or which appears to the court, to be 
journalistic, literary or artistic material. In such case, the court must 
have regard to the extent to which the material has, or is about to, 
become available to the public, or it is, or would be, in the public 
interest for the material to be published. Nonetheless, this section 
does not render freedom of expression to be an absolute right nor 
place greater weight to such freedom compared to other competing 
Convention rights such as the right to privacy. It merely grants 
discretion to the court to lean in favour of freedom of expression 
within the margin of appreciation enjoyed under the convention.66 
To sum up, it is submitted that the right to freedom of expression 
is now clearly spelt out in the HRA but the exercise of such right is 
not absolute as it is subjected to certain restrictions and limitations.
Application of International Treaties in Malaysia
Prior to the Merdeka Day,67 the courts in Malaysia (Federation of 
Malaya) had adopted a similar approach to that practised by the 
British courts namely the doctrine of transformation for treaties and 
the doctrine of incorporation with certain limitations for customary 
66 Supra note 51, 42 - 25.
67 31 August 1957.
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international law.68 Post Merdeka Day, the operation of any law 
(either municipal or international) is made subject to the express 
provisions of the Federal Constitution (the FC). Article 4(1) of the 
FC provides that:
This Constitution is the supreme law of the Federation 
and any law passed after Merdeka Day which is 
inconsistent with this Constitution shall, to the extent 
of the inconsistency, be void. 
This provision upholds the notion of constitutional supremacy in 
the Malaysian legal system as it expressly stipulates that the FC 
shall be the highest law of the land and any laws shall be declared 
void if they are in confl ict with any provisions of the FC. The 
status of the FC has also been observed by Tun Suffi an LP in the 
case of Ah Thian v. Government of Malaysia69 that the doctrine of 
Parliamentary supremacy does not apply in Malaysia as the FC is 
the highest law of the country and it can lawfully restrict the power 
of the Parliament to make law. Nonetheless, a close scrutiny of 
the aforesaid provision reveals that the law is silent on the status 
of international law (either international treaty law or customary 
international law). Further, there are no specifi c provisions in the FC 
that deal with the application of international law. Thus, reference 
must be made to general provisions and decided cases that may lend 
some assistance on this matter.
Article 39 of the FC which outlines the executive authority in 
Malaysia provides that:
The executive authority of the Federation shall be 
vested in the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and exercisable 
… by him or by the Cabinet or any Minister authorised 
by the Cabinet…. 
Further, Article 80(1) states that:
…the executive authority of the Federation extends to 
all matters with respect to which Parliament may make 
laws…. 
68 Supra note 12, 197.
69 [1976] 2 MLJ 112. 
30
The power of the Parliament to enact laws is stated in Article 74(1) 
of the FC whereby it stipulates that:
…Parliament may make laws with respect to any 
of the matters enumerated in the Federal List70 or 
the Concurrent List71…” The Federal List among 
others covers ‘external affairs, including (a) treaties, 
agreements and conventions with other countries and 
all matters which bring the Federation into relations 
with other countries; (b) implementation of treaties, 
agreements and conventions with other countries; …. 
Thus, the aforesaid provisions prove that the power to conclude 
international treaties, agreements and conventions is exclusively 
reserved to the executive authority of the country (i.e. the YDPA) 
and could only be exercised by the YDPA himself or any authorised 
Minister of the Malaysian Government. The Parliament, as the law 
making body in the country, is only entrusted to implement the 
treaties and incorporate them into domestic laws so that they are 
enforceable in the domestic courts.
This position is clearly illustrated by the judgment of Thomson 
CJ in the case of The Government of the State of Kelantan v. The 
Government of the Federation of Malaya and Tunku Abdul Rahman 
Putra Al-Haj.72 In this case, the state government of Kelantan 
has commenced proceedings against the Federal Government 
and Tunku Abdul Rahman arguing that the Malaysia Agreement, 
an international treaty which was signed on 9th July 1965 by the 
Federation of Malaya, the United Kingdom, Singapore, Sarawak 
and North Borneo (Sabah) was null and void on the ground that the 
consent of the individual states in the Federation of Malaya had not 
been formally procured before the conclusion of the agreement. It was 
held that by referring to Articles 39 and 80(1) of the FC, the Malaysia 
Agreement was not a nullity as the power to conclude the agreement 
was lawfully exercised by the body that was conferred express 
authority by all of the states in the Federation. As Thomson CJ said:
70 Federal List means the First List of the Ninth Schedule – Article 160(2) of the 
FC.
71 Concurrent List means the Third List of the Ninth Schedule – Article 160(2) of 
the FC.
72 [1963] 1 MLJ 355.
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The Malaysia Agreement is signed for the Federation 
of Malaya by the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime 
Minister and four other members of the Cabinet. There 
is nothing whatsoever in the Constitution requiring 
consultation with any State Government or the Ruler 
of any State.73
This decision clearly espoused the principle that the treaty-making 
capacity is exclusively entrusted by the FC to the Executive or the 
Cabinet.74 Since any treaties would only be enforceable domestically 
upon the passing off necessary laws by the Parliament, the Malaysia 
Act 1963 was enacted on 16 September 1963 subsequent to the 
signing of the Malaysia Agreement. There are a few other statutes 
that have been passed by the Parliament to give legal effects to 
international treaties that have been ratifi ed by Malaysia including 
the Geneva Conventions Act 1962, the Diplomatic Privileges (Vienna 
Convention) Act 1966, the International Organisations (Privileges 
and Immunities) Act 1992, the Consular Relations (Privileges and 
Immunities) Act 1999 and many others.75 On the other hand, it is 
argued that there are treaties that can be implemented and enforced 
without the necessity of enacting any relevant legislation.76 A good 
illustration would be the Treaty of Friendship between the Malaysia 
and Indonesia which was signed on 10 April 1959 and has resulted 
in several cultural exchanges being implemented between the 
neighbouring countries without specifi c legislation.77 Nonetheless, 
in general international treaties that have signifi cant impact on 
the rights of individuals in the country or involve major changes 
in municipal law would defi nitely require relevant statutes to be 
passed by the Parliament to be legally enforceable in the local 
courts.
73 Ibid, 359
74 Abdul Ghafur Hamid, “Treaty-Making Power in Federal States with Special 
Reference to the Malaysian Position,” Journal of Malaysian and Comparative 
Law Vol. 30 (2003): 80 - 82.
75 Supra note 12.
76 Heliliah Haji Yusof, “Internal Application of International Law in Malaysia and 
Singapore,” Singapore Law Review 1 (1969): 65.
77 Ibid.
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Relation between International Treaties and Freedom of 
Expression in Malaysia
At present, Malaysia has only ratifi ed two international treaties on 
human rights namely CEDAW and CRC.78 Both of these treaties 
were acceded to in 1995 with certain reservations on the basis of 
religious and national or cultural relativism.79 The country has 
also signed, though not ratifi ed,80 CRPD81 but unfortunately, the 
ICCPR which safeguards fundamental human rights including the 
right to freedom of expression has yet to be signed. The Malaysian 
government has been urged by the Human Rights Commission of 
Malaysia (SUHAKAM) to ratify certain core treaties including the 
ICCPR but so far the situation remains the same. Arguably it is 
claimed that special protection accorded to the Bumiputera as well 
as the persistent use of several legislations which contravenes the 
fundamental liberties are among the key factors for such resistance.82
The non-accession of the ICCPR is further intensifi ed with the 
absence of regional arrangements that ought to safeguard the 
fundamental rights of the people in Asia or Asia-Pacifi c. 83 The 
signifi cance of establishing a regional human rights regime 
comparable to the ECHR in Europe, Pact of San José in America or 
Banjul Charter in Africa has been explicitly stressed by the Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action (the VDPA).84 Article 37 of 
the VDPA stipulates that:
Regional arrangements play a fundamental role in 
promoting and protecting human rights. They should 
reinforce universal human rights standards, as 
78 CRC was acceded on 17th February 1995 whilst CEDAW was on 5th July 
1995. For details see Malaysia’s status at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/
Statusfrset?OpenFrameSet, (accessed 16 March 2010).
79 Jaclyn Ling-Chien Neo, “Malaysia’s First Report to the CEDAW Committee: 
A Landmark Event for Women’s Rights in Malaysia,” Asian Yearbook of 
International Law 13 (2007): 303.
80 CRPD was signed on 8th April 2008.
81 Elizabeth Looi and Shanon Shah, Human Rights: What’s Stopping Malaysia? 
(The Nut Graph, December 10, 2008), http://www.thenutgraph.com/print/1226, 
(accessed March 17, 2010).
82 Ibid.
83 Ralph Wilde, “NGO Proposals for an Asia-Pacifi c Human Rights System,” Yale 
Human Rights & Development Law Journal 1 (1998): 137.
84 The VDPA is a human rights declaration adopted by consensus at the World 
Conference on Human Rights on 25 June 1993 in Vienna, Austria.
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contained in international human rights instruments, 
and their protection…The World Conference on Human 
Rights reiterates the need to consider the possibility of 
establishing regional and sub-regional ar rangements 
for the promotion and protection of human rights where 
they do not already exist.
In line with the aforesaid provision, several proposals and 
recommendations have been put forward by various parties in 
realising the establishment of such regime for the Asian region. 
Unfortunately, until a concrete resolution and mutual agreement 
could be reached between leaders of the Asian countries, it is very 
much unlikely to see such regime to be translated into a reality in 
the near future.
Regardless of the non-application of the ICCPR and the lack of 
regional human rights regime for Asia, the right to freedom of 
expression is principally accorded to all citizens in Malaysia. The 
right to freedom of expression together with other fundamental 
rights are clearly provided in Part II of the FC (Articles 5 – 13) 
under the heading of ‘Fundamental Liberties’. These provisions are 
specifi cally arranged after the supremacy clause of the FC in Article 
4 and by virtue of this setting, it appears that the exercise of freedom 
of expression and other basic human rights is very well guarded and 
constitutionally bestowed upon all of the Malaysian citizens. Hence, 
it can be concluded that the international treaties on human rights 
have no signifi cant impact on the right to freedom of expression 
in Malaysia since such right has been exclusively included in the 
provision of the Constitution itself.
The Right to Freedom of Expression in Malaysia
The right to freedom of expression is explicitly stated in Article 
10(1) of the FC which provides that:
Subject to Clauses (2), (3) and (4) – (a) every citizen has the right to 
freedom of speech and expression. 
Plain reading of this article shows that such right is guaranteed to 
the Malaysian citizens only and non-citizens are not entitled to this 
freedom, though other rights such as freedom of religion and right 
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to property are made available to them.85 The right to freedom of 
expression is not exclusively reserved to political speech only86 as 
commercial and artistic expressions are also protected by the law 
though they receive less attention from the public. As to the level 
of protection between these three classes of speech, it is unclear 
whether the situation in Malaysia would be similar to the UK, which 
accord highest protection to the political speech compared to other 
types of speech.87 As such, in the absence of any express provisions 
and decided cases, it is submitted that there would be no different 
treatment between these categories of expression. 
In the opening sentence of the aforesaid article, the exercise of this 
right is straight away subjected to various limitations in clauses 2, 3 
and 4.88 Clause 2 to Article 10 reads:
Parliament may by law impose –
(a) on the rights conferred by paragraph (a) of Clause 
(1), such restrictions as it deems necessary or expedient 
in the interest of the security of the Federation or any 
part thereof, friendly relations with other countries, 
public order or morality and restrictions designed 
to protect the privileges of Parliament or of any 
Legislative Assembly or to provide against contempt of 
court, defamation, or incitement to any offence.
85 Shad Saleem Faruqi, “Human Rights and the Constitution,” in Human Rights 
and the National Commission, ed. S. Sothi Rachagan and Ramdas Tikamdas 
(HAKAM, 1999), 140.
86 The House of Lords in Reynolds v. Times Newspaper Ltd [2001] 2 A.C. 127 at 
page 175 confi ned political speech only to ‘statements made about the actions 
and qualities of those currently or formerly elected to Parliament and those 
with immediate aspirations to be members, so far as those actions and qualities 
directly affected their capacity … to meet their public responsibilities’. 
87 In the leading case of Lingens v. Austria (1986) 8 E.H.R.R. 407, it was ruled 
that political speech is the core of a democratic society that should be given 
more protection by the courts. This ruling has been followed by the English 
courts in other cases including Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home De-
partment [2000] 2 A.C. 115 and Reynolds v. Times Newspaper Ltd [2001] 2 
A.C. 127.
88 Clause 3 is not related with freedom of expression because it restricts the right 
to form associations under Article 10(1)(c) of the Constitution.
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Thus, clause (2) endows the Parliament with eight grounds to restrict 
the exercise of such right. Further, clause 4 of the same article adds 
up another four limitations on freedom of expression. This clause reads:
In imposing restrictions in the interest of the security of 
the Federation or any part thereof or public order under 
Clause (2)(a), Parliament may pass law prohibiting 
the questioning of any matter, right, status, position, 
privilege, sovereignty or prerogative established or 
protected by the provisions of Part III, Article 152,153 
or 181 otherwise than in relation to the implementation 
thereof as may be specifi ed in such law.
It is essential to note here that clause 4 was introduced subsequent to 
the constitutional amendment in 1971. The amendment was passed 
following the race riots in several parts of the country in 1969.89 
As a result, the Parliament has been entrusted with more legislative 
power to further restrain freedom of expression on matters which are 
considered to be politically sensitive in Malaysia. They are the right 
to citizenship in Part III of the FC, the status of the Malay language 
in Article 152, the position and privileges of the Malays and the 
natives of Sabah and Sarawak in Article 153 and the prerogatives 
of the Malay Sultans and the Ruling Chiefs of Negeri Sembilan in 
Article 181.
For this reason, it has been observed that the article is remarkable 
for what it takes away rather than what it gives.90 Article 10 of the 
FC can be regarded as the most repressive provision as it provides 
abundant restrictions on freedom of expression. The provision of 
Article 10 has also been discussed in the case of Lau Dak Kee v. 
Public Prosecutor.91 It was ruled by Mohamed Azmi J that:
 
Article 10(1) of the Federal Constitution guarantees the 
rights of every citizen to freedom of speech, assembly 
and association. These rights are, however, subject to 
any law passed by Parliament.92 
89 Andrew Harding, Law, Government and the Constitution in Malaysia (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996), 42 - 45.
90 Ibid, 169.
91 [1976] 2 MLJ 229.
92 Ibid p. 230.
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Apart from Article 10, the Parliament is also authorised by Article 
149 to pass legislative action to fi ght subversion whilst Article 150 
permits the Parliament to enact statutes to combat an emergency. 
Altogether there are fourteen massively broad grounds available for 
the Parliament to legally confi ne the exercise of this right. Hence, 
it is submitted that the existence of these restrictions has a great 
impact on democracy in Malaysia as it has rendered the exercise of 
freedom of expression at the mercy of Parliament.93 
The rationale for having these restrictions has been aptly described 
by Raja Azlan Shah J in PP v. Ooi Kee Saik & Ors94 who quoted 
the following passage from A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras95 with 
approval:
There cannot be any such thing as absolute or 
uncontrolled liberty wholly free from restraint; for that 
would lead to anarchy and disorder. The possession and 
enjoyment of all rights ... are subject to such reasonable 
conditions as may be deemed to be ... essential to the 
safety, health, peace and general order and morals of 
the community ... What the Constitution attempts to 
do in declaring the rights of the people is to strike a 
balance between individual liberty and social control.96
This judgment emphasised on the signifi cance of imposing 
certain limitations since unbridled freedom might be misused 
as an instrument of mischief. In fact, most democratic countries 
in the world such as the UK and even the US, which accords 
strong protection to free speech in the First Amendment to the US 
Constitution,97 have devised certain limitations to this right most 
notably child pornography and obscenity laws which aim to protect 
93 Shad Saleem Faruqi, “The All-Powerful Executive”, October 1, 2005, 2, http://
www.sun2surf.com/articlePrint.cfm?id=11381, (accessed August 23, 2010).
94 [1971] 2 MLJ 108
95 AIR [1950] SC 27
96 Ibid p. 111.
97 Amendment I of the United States Constitution provides that: “Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances”.
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the broader interest of the community. Undoubtedly, the extent and 
necessity of restrictions on freedom of expression in Malaysia are 
different from other countries due to the local circumstances and 
political experiences in the past.
Nonetheless, the Parliament’s assessment of the necessity or 
expediency of any of these limitations is not open for challenge.98 The 
only possible recourse is through an application to declare that such 
law is unconstitutional on the ground that it falls outside the scope 
specifi ed by the Constitution. This point has also been addressed by 
Chang Min Tat J in Madhavan Nair v. Public Prosecutor that:
Any condition limiting the exercise of the fundamental 
right to freedom of speech not failing within the four 
corners of Article 10 clauses (2), (3) and (4) of the 
Federal Constitution cannot be valid.
This judgment signifi ed that the validity of such a law limiting 
freedom of expression could be challenged in the court of law. 
Unfortunately, although there have been nine challenges99 against 
the validity of laws passed by the Parliament after independence, so 
far there is not a single law that has been declared unconstitutional 
by the court.100 Due to these reasons, it is feared that the legislative 
power conferred on the Parliament is open to abuse by the 
government to maintain its political power. 101 Due to this reason, 
98 Article 4(2)(b) of the Constitution provides that “The validity of any law shall 
not be questioned on the ground that – it imposes such restrictions as are men-
tioned in Article 10(2) but those restrictions were not deemed necessary or ex-
pedient by Parliament for the purpose mentioned in that Article”.
99 The cases are City Council of George Town v. Government of Penang [1967] 
1 MLJ 169; Selangor Pilots Association v. Government of Malaysia [1975] 2 
MLJ 66; PP v. Datuk Haji Harun [1977] 1 MLJ 180; Teh Cheng Poh v. PP 
[1979] 1 MLJ 50; Malaysian Bar v. Government of Malaysia [1986] 2 MLJ 
225; Menon v. Government of Malaysia [1987] 2 MLJ 642; PP v. Dato’ Yap 
Peng [1987] 2 MLJ 311; Mamat bin Daud v. Government of Malaysia [1988] 
1 MLJ 119; Haji Nordin Salleh & Haji Wan Mohamed Najib Wan Mohamed v. 
Dewan Undangan Negeri Kelantan [1992] 1 MLJ 143.
100 Abdul Aziz Bari and Farid Sufi an Shuaib, Constitution of Malaysia: Text and 
Commentary (Petaling Jaya: Prentice Hall, 2004), 34.
101 Abdul Aziz Bari, Malaysian Constitution: A Critical Introduction (Kuala 
Lumpur: Other Press, 2003), 153 - 156.
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some scholars claimed that the right to freedom of expression in 
this country is residual in nature102 since it can paradoxically, only 
be exercised subject to various restrictions imposed by other laws.
Conclusion
International human rights treaties have considerable effects 
on the exercise of the right to freedom of expression in the UK. 
Such right has now been formally incorporated into the HRA and 
undoubtedly it should no longer be viewed as residual in nature. 
Nonetheless, freedom of expression is not an absolute right and its 
implementation may be restricted by certain limitations so long as 
they are ‘prescribed by law’ and ‘necessary in a democratic society’. 
On the other hand, international treaties on human rights have 
less signifi cant impact in Malaysia. Arguably, it is submitted that 
the Malaysian FC has expressly contained a specifi c chapter on 
fundamental liberties including Article which clearly guarantees 
the right to freedom of expression to all citizens. Nonetheless, 
the exercise of this right is highly controversial since it is made 
subjected to numerous statutory constraints passed by the Parliament 
and challenges on the validity of these statutes has yet to claim any 
success. Thus, it is submitted that the legal position is still unclear 
whether the right to freedom of expression is really exercisable in its 
true sense in this country.
102 Supra note 99, 33.
